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GOING PRIVATE: AN EXAMINATION OF GOING PRIVATE
TRANSACTIONS USING THE BUSINESS
PURPOSE STANDARD
by Richard L. Scott
Expansion and contraction, like all movements affecting nations, in-
stitutions, individuals and corporations, creates turbulence and discom-
fort in varying degrees of intensity, and almost inevitably, dislocations.
Those affected, the threatened and the dispossessed, often turn to the
courts as a last resort to protect their positions and to attempt to stave
off the ultimate change.'
In the 1970's one type of corporate change of increasing significance has
been the return of public corporations to private status. 2 This "going pri-
vate" 3 phenomenon has brought an increasing number of minority share-
holders to the courts in an attempt to prevent the destruction of their equity
interest in corporations.' In spite of the conformity of such transactions with
state statutory procedures, a number of state5 and federal courts 6 have
1. Tanzer Economic Assocs., Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87
Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
2. In contrast, during the late 1960's and early 1970's over 3,000 corporations went public.
See Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., " 'Going Private': A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility,"
Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 20, 1974), reprinted in [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010.
3. Pursuant to § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter referred to as
"the 1934 Act"], 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976), most issuers having outstanding equity security held
by 500 or more persons are required to register the security with the SEC and thereby become
subject to the periodic reporting requirements imposed by §§ 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1976). Companies going private almost always have as their prime
objective the elimination of a sufficient number of shareholders so as to terminate both
registration under § 12 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), and the concomitant obligation to
furnish periodic reports to shareholders and the SEC. See generally 4 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW: FRAUD (New Matter) § 4.7 (Supp. 1977); F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 5.32 (1975); Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 987 (1974); Brudney, A Note On "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975);
Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976);
Moore, Going'Private: Techniques and Problems of Eliminating the Public Shareholder, I J.
CORP. L. 321 (1976); Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial
Standards and Proposals for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975); Vorenberg, Exclu-
siveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964);
Comment, "Going Private"--The Insider's Fiduciary Duty and Rule lOb-5: Is Fairness Requi-
site?, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 565 (1976); Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders from
Freeze-Outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976).
4. For a discussion of reasons for mergers and the present trend toward their increased
use, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRLESTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 487-96
(1972).
5. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. 1975);
People v. Concord Fabrics, 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div.
2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remand-
ed for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d
369 (7th Cir. 1941).
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expressed a willingness to examine the substance of going private transac-
tions wherein minority shareholders are eliminated.7 Controversy continues,
however, over what protection the eliminated minority shareholder should
be granted. 8 Traditionally, the exclusive remedy available to minority share-
holders has been appraisal of their stock pursuant to state dissenters' ap-
praisal statutes. Because of the inadequacy of these statutes, some courts
have used concepts of fiduciary duty to protect minority interests, granting
both injunctive and monetary relief.9 This fiduciary duty requires the major-
ity shareholders to treat minority shareholders fairly in all corporate transac-
tions. Alleged breaches of this duty have been raised in both state and
federal courts. At the state level, minority shareholders have alleged a
violation of common law fiduciary obligations when the majority sharehold-
ers or the corporation itself had engaged in corporate transactions which
resulted in detriment to the minority. At the federal level, minority share-
holders have attempted to imply a similar breach of fiduciary duty within
section 10(b) and rule lOb-510 when the corporate transaction had no legiti-
mate corporate purpose. While the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the
applicability of the business purpose requirement in the area of federal
securities law, in the last four years this business purpose requirement has
been used increasingly by state courts as a standard with which to examine
going private transactions in light of common law fiduciary obligations."
This Comment discusses the methods used in going private, federal and
state attempts to apply the business purpose test to such transactions, the
legitimacy of various proposed business purposes, and the imposition of the
burden of proof in challenges to such transactions.
7. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977), noted in 31 Sw. L.J. 739 (1977); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
8. Some courts have emphasized a general obligation of loyalty and good faith owed by
corporate officers and directors to the corporation; other courts assume that directors' deci-
sions should be overturned only in exceptional cases. Compare Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (directors must show good faith in authorizing purchase of shares),
with Cumberland Publishing Co. v. Adams, 432 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1968) (courts will not interfere
with management of majority unless there is actual fraud or such a wasting of corporate
property as amounts to fraud).
9. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974) (injunctive relief); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969)
(monetary relief). In contrast, however, the court in Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., No. CA-000268
(Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Co., Nov. 19, 1975), fashioned a remedy which satisfied neither party.
The court conditioned completion of the merger on the deposit in escrow of stock of the
surviving corporation sufficient to cover the demands of those shareholders who desired to
retain their interest in the corporation. Thus, the shareholders had the opportunity to retain
their corporate interest or to resort to an appraisal of their corporate interest. Comment, The
Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric
Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184, 1203-04 (1976).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); SEC Rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (1977).
I1. Five jurisdictions now utilize the business purpose standard in evaluating going private
transactions. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974) (applying Georgia corporate law); Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., No. CA-000268 (Cal.
Super. Ct., L.A. Co., Nov. 19, 1975), cited in Comment, supra note 9, at 1203; Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87




I. METHODS OF GOING PRIVATE
Formerly, under most state corporate codes, minority shareholders had
such rights as mandatory cumulative voting12 and required shareholder ap-
proval of certain corporate decisions. 13 Since World War II, however, a
significant number of states have severely reduced such statutory protection
for minority shareholders, 4 enabling controlling shareholders to eliminate
minority shareholders with impunity. 5 Such elimination has been accom-
plished through both voluntary and involuntary means. 6 In an involuntary
or compulsory transaction, the public shareholders may be compelled to
terminate their equity holdings. This mandatory type of transaction,
commonly known as a freeze-out 7 of the public shareholders, includes
mergers,' 8 sales of assets,19 and reverse stock splits. 20 In a voluntary transac-
tion, on the other hand, the shareholder is given the choice of "cashing in"
his equity interest or remaining with the corporation. These volitional trans-
actions include the cash tender offer 2' or any number of possible exchange
offers either for debt or nonvoting equity interests.
The return of a public corporation to private status typically involves the
use of both involuntary and voluntary transactions. 22 In most going private
transactions the first step involves a control group gaining dominance over
the corporation; the second step involves the subsequent elimination of the
remaining minority interest. The dominance or voluntary stage is usually
accomplished by either an open market purchase of the corporation's stock
by the corporation itself or by the control group, an exchange offer of some
form of nonvoting, callable preferred stock or debt for the outstanding
voting common stock, or a cash tender offer by the control group or the
corporation for the outstanding stock of the corporation. The elimination or
12. See I MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 33 (2d ed. 1971). Cumulative voting was originally
devised to protect minorities by providing a method of voting which assured minorities repre-
sentation on the board of directors roughly proportionate to the minority's size.
13. The Model Business Corporation Act as originally drafted provided that each share of
stock carried the right to vote on a proposed plan of merger or consolidation whether or not the
stock was entitled to vote under the articles of incorporation. A 1962 amendment eliminated this
provision on the ground that shareholders who had waived the right to vote on all other
fundamental issues deserved no inalienable right to vote on mergers or consolidations. The 1969
amendment, however, requires that notice be given to a shareholder of record whether or not
entitled to vote and that the notice state the purpose of the meeting. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 73, 2, Comment (2d ed. 1971).
14. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.03. For example, Texas substantially revised its
Business Corporation Act in 1973. See Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corporation
Law-Part 1, 28 Sw. L.J. 641 (1974). Many of the 1973 amendments to the Texas Business
Corporation Act were based on the 1969 revision to the Model Business Corporation Act,
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. (2d ed. 1971).
15. In most jurisdictions the only recourse was the dissenting shareholder's appraisal
rights. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 3.
16. For case examples of different going private techniques, see Moore, supra note 3, at
324-27.
17. A freeze-out describes any action by those in control of the corporation which results in
the termination of a stockholder's interest in the enterprise. See Vorenberg, supra note 3, at
1192; Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961).
18. See notes 58-65 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 38-43 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 44-57 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 25-36 infra and accompanying text.
22. For a general discussion of methods of going private, see Solomon, supra note 3, at
148-55.
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involuntary stage is then accomplished either by a sale of the operating
assets by the corporation or by a merger of the acquired corporation with a
second corporation wholly owned by the control group, thus resulting in an
exchange of the minority's equity interest in the acquired corporation for
securities of the acquiring corporation, or cash, or both. Elimination may
also be accomplished with a technique known as the reverse stock split
followed by a cash payoff of remaining fractional shares.23
A. Voluntary Transactions
If the control group already has sufficient voting power to obtain the
necessary shareholder vote for a sale of assets, merger, or reverse stock
split, the attainment of dominance is unnecessary. Where this is not the case
tender and exchange offers are common techniques for acquiring a signifi-
cant percentage of the outstanding shares.2 1 Corporate capital structure and
available cash, however, necessarily place limitations on which methods
may be used.
Tender and Exchange Offers. A predominant method employed to gain
control of a corporation is for the corporation 25 to make a tender offer26 to its
public shareholders for the purchase of all or substantially all of the out-
standing shares. 27 The corporation offers to purchase at a specified price,
normally using cash or a combination of cash, debentures, and preferred
stock28 as consideration.29 The tender offer can usually be accomplished
with a minimum amount of interference from dissenting minority sharehold-
ers, as a shareholder vote is not required to approve such action and under
no state corporate statutes are dissenters' appraisal rights available in such
circumstances."0 While a tender offer is considered a voluntary transaction,
23. See, e.g., Tanzer v. Haynie, 405 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Levine v. Biddle
Sawyer Corp., 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,586 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
24. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1393, aff'd, 521
F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975) (Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. obtained a 57% ownership in
Meridian through two independent tender offers).
25. In many instances the controlling shareholder will begin by purchasing shares in the
market and follow by causing the corporation to make a formal tender offer for all or part of the
remaining shares. SEC Rule 10b-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1977), however, prohibits, subject
to certain exceptions, an issuer or other person who has made a tender or exchange offer from
purchasing or arranging to purchase any equity security which is the subject of such offer
otherwise than pursuant to the offer.
26. A tender offer may be defined as a public offer to purchase shares of stock for cash or
cash and other securities. Comment, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973). This definition has
undergone significant expansion under the federal securities laws. Id. at 1260-70.
27. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 13-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Broder v.
Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). A variation to have an "employee share
ownership trust," perhaps newly formed as a vehicle for compensating shareholder-employees
and other key employees, make the purchases of the publicly held shares. Such a trust is usually
financed by corporate contributions and by loans.
28. Occasionally, redeemable preferred stock may be used, thus permitting the corporation
to eliminate the holders by calling in the stock for redemption.
29. The consideration specified usually represents a premium over the current market price
of the securities sought. A survey published in 1967 reported the median price offered was 16%
over the market price of the desired shares two days before the offer. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics
of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 140.
30. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 80 (2d ed. 1971). The right of appraisal is
generally only available in mergers and consolidations. In some states appraisal rights are given
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when many shareholders tender their shares the tender offeree is faced with
the prospect of reduced liquidity and partial deprivation of the protection of
the federal securities laws, thus making the transaction in practical terms
resemble an involuntary transaction.3 Tender offers by issuers have been
subject only to limited, indirect federal regulation.32 The Williams Act, 33 for
instance, specifically exempted from some of its provisions offers by issuers
for their own securities. The SEC, however, in the wake of the Supreme
Court decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,34 has proposed a rule
regulating going private transactions and has introduced a separate proposal
on issuer tender and exchange offers.
35
Since "every corporation has its share of irrational investors who would
never willingly abandon their shares," 36 a tender or exchange offer is norm-
ally only the first step in a going private transaction. The minority is seldom
totally eliminated without the second or involuntary step. 37
B. Involuntary Transactions
Sales of Assets and Dissolution. Once control is acquired, one method of
eliminating the remaining minority interest is for the majority shareholders
of the corporation to sell all or part of its business or assets. 38 The sale is
for substantial transfers of assets and in a few others for certain amendments to the articles of
incorporation. See Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1189.
31. It has been suggested that the tender offeree faces the prospect that, if many sharehold-
ers tender their shares, the market for his stock may be "reduced to glacial activity and the
liquidity of the Mojave Desert." Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 2, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010, at 84,696.
32. With the exception of SEC Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-13 (1977), which prohibits
short tendering during any offer, issuer tender offers are regulated only by the existence of
antifraud remedies.
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). The Williams Act had as its primary thrust
the traditional protection of investors by requiring full disclosure of the terms, conditions, and
financing of the tender offer, as well as the identity and pertinent background information
regarding the offeror.
34. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). For an excellent discussion of the case, see Note, The "New
Fraud" Becomes No Fraud: Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 31 Sw. L.J. 739 (1977).
35. The new proposal will require:
(1) that the offer remain open for at least 15 business days after publication;(2) offers to be made to all holders of the class of subject securities except odd
lots of fewer than 100 shares;(3) securities deposited could be withdrawn at any time until 10 days after the
offer is first published and if they are not accepted for payment, after 40
business days from the date of the original offer;(4) if more securities are deposited within 10 days of the offer, the issuer must
accept them on a pro rata basis. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 34-14234, 432 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-I (Dec. 14, 1977).
36. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 910 (1974).
37. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Institutional Inv. Sys., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (through the tender offer the defendants were
only able to obtain 85% of the stock).
38. Early attempts to squeeze-out minority shareholders usually involved a sale of assets.
Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), provides an example of such an
attempt. A shipping company was dissolved and its assets purchased by a steel company under
common control. The minority shareholders brought suit to recover damages claimed to have
been incurred by reason of the alleged fraudulent acts of dissolving the shipping company,
buying its assets, and appropriating its business. The plaintiff's theory was that the defendant
utilized its dominant position as majority stockholder to force the steamship company out of a
prosperous going business, bringing about its dissolution, and taking over its property and
business to the detriment of the minority shareholders. The court, applying a fiduciary duty
standard, found for the plaintiffs, allowing as damages the difference between what plaintiffs
had received from the sale of the physical assets and the value of the stock as stock in a going
prosperous concern continuing in business.
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usually made to a "shell" corporation owned and organized by the majority
shareholders. The old corporation is then liquidated with the minority share-
holders receiving cash, stock, or debentures for their equity interest in the
old corporation. 9 At common law, in the absence of a provision in the
corporate charter so authorizing, the sale of all the assets of a solvent
corporation required unanimous shareholder consent.40 Today, however,
almost all states permit corporations to sell their assets without unanimous
shareholder approval." The statutory trend has been to reduce the share-
holder vote required for approval of such action. Many modern statutes
permit a sale upon approval by a simple majority of the shares entitled to
vote.4 2 While the trend has consistently been to reduce the percentage
approval required for a sale, numerous jurisdictions have conferred apprais-
al rights upon dissenters whenever a corporation sells all or substantially all
of the corporate assets.43
The Reverse Stock Split. The reverse stock split is a compulsory method of
eliminating the minority in going private transactions in jurisdictions that
either permit or require a corporation to redeem outstanding fractional
shares.' The essence of a reverse stock split is the amendment of the
39. In the absence of a statute so providing, shareholders in the old corporation cannot be
compelled to accept securities in the new corporation in exchange for their shares except when
the shares have an established market value making them readily convertible and thus equiva-
lent to cash. F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.17.
40. See Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co., 124 Iowa 107, 99 N.W. 290 (1904) (although state
law at that time did not contain a statutory provision on sale of all assets, the court held that a
prosperous corporation could dispose of all its assets over the objection of a minority share-
holder where its charter authorized the sale of all assets); City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight
Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879) (charter provision allowing directors to sell all corporate assets without
unanimous shareholder approval was valid).
The unanimous shareholder approval rule was relaxed to permit the directors or majority
shareholders of an insolvent corporation to approve the sale of all its assets. Butler v. New
Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. 371, 93 A. 380 (1915); Skinner v. Smith, 134 N.Y. 240, 31
N.E. 911, 10 N.Y.S. 81 (1892); see Note, Disposition of Corporate Assets, 43 N.C.L. REV. 957,
958 (1965).
The reasoning behind this rule was that each shareholder had a contractual right to have the
corporation continue during its existence to seek to accomplish the purposes for which it was
created. As a disposition of all corporate assets tended to frustrate the achievement of corpo-
rate objectives, such a transaction had to be approved by all the shareholders. See Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Note, Privilege of Majority Shareholders to
Dissolve the Corporation or to Sell All or Substantially All of Its Assets Overthe Protests of the
Minority, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 412 (1946).
41. See, e.g., 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 79 (2d ed. 1971) (approval by majority of
shareholders); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (approval by two-
thirds of outstanding stock entitled to vote).
42. See, e.g., 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 79 (2d ed. 1971).
43. Appraisal statutes authorize a shareholder who dissents from certain corporate transac-
tions to demand that the corporation purchase his shares at their appraised value. See generally
Latin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 307 (1958).
44. A reverse stock split occurs when a number of shares are combined to form a smaller
number of shares. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 330, at 673 (2d ed. 1970). For a discussion
of reverse stock splits, see F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.32; Dykstra, The Reverse Stock Split-
That Other Means of Going Private, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1976); Lawson, Reverse Stock
Split: The Fiduciary's Obligations Under State Law, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1226 (1975). The
corporate statutes of most jurisdictions contain four provisions which can be combined by
issuers to freeze out minority shareholders through a reverse stock split and repurchase of
fractional shares: (I) a corporation may amend its articles of incorporation to increase or
decrease the authorized number of shares, or to reclassify or cancel all or part of its shares; (2) a
corporation may issue fractional shares, or the board of directors may in lieu thereof pay in
[Vol. 32
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corporate charter to allow for the consolidation of the number of shares
authorized and outstanding. 5 While most jurisdictions authorize the is-
suance of fractional share certificates, 46 many state statutes provide two
alternatives to the issuance of fractional shares. One alternative is the
issuance of scrip or warrants; 47 the other is the payment of cash in lieu of
fractional shares. 48 The reverse stock split has distinct advantages and
disadvantages over the other involuntary methods.4 9 The advantages include
certainty as to the number of remaining shareholders, finality in the elimina-
tion of minority shareholders, 50 cost savings," unavailability of dissenters'
appraisal rights,5 2 and insulation from litigation.5 3 The principal disadvan-
tage is that such a transaction requires amendment of the corporate char-
ter.5 4 An additional disadvantage is that the reverse stock split requires the
preparing and filing of proxy materials. 5
Occasionally fractional shares are outlawed, either by state statute56 or by
the articles of incorporation. This forces fractional shareholders to purchase
cash the fair value of fractional shares, in the same transaction that triggered the fractional
share interest; (3) a corporation may purchase or otherwise acquire its own shares for the
purpose of eliminating fractional shares that are outstanding and that were not liquidated as part
of the triggering transaction; and (4) a corporation may issue scrip in lieu of fractional shares
subject to the condition that the shares for which scrip is exchangeable may be sold by the
corporation and the proceeds thereof distributed to the holder of scrip. Id. at 1228.
45. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 59 (2d ed. 1971) (approval by a majority of
outstanding shares entitled to vote and a majority of the outstanding shares of each class
entitled to vote); TEX. Bus. CORP. AT ANN. art. 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (approval by two-
thirds of outstanding shares entitled to vote and two-thirds of shares in each class entitled to
vote).
46. Fractional share interests are typically vested with the same substantive rights given to
full equity shares for purposes of voting, dividend declarations, and participation in the
distribution of assets at dissolution, but these rights are exercisable only in proportion to the
fractional interest. See, e.g., I MODEL Bus. CORP. AT ANN. § 24 (2d ed. 1971).
47. While scrip and warrants preserve a shareholder's proprietary interest in the corpora-
tion, they confer no substantive shareholder rights. Scrip and warrant holders are generally
denied rights in voting, dividends, and liquidation participation unless otherwise provided by
the issuing corporation in the articles of incorporation. Id.
48. The alternatives were provided because of the administrative inconvenience of comput-
ing dividends and votes on fractional shares. Lawson, supra note 44, at 1229-30.
49. See Dykstra, supra note 44, at 7-13
50. In a tender or exchange offer, there is usually the need to "mop-up" the lingering
minority. Lawson, supra note 44, at 7.
51. Securities to be offered in a merger or consolidation generally must be registered under
the Securities Act of 1933 by the terms of SEC Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1977), requiring a
registration statement. SEC Rule 145(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(1) (1977), specifically ex-
cludes a reverse stock split from this requirement. The cost of a tender or exchange offer is
normally higher because it usually involves the current market price plus a sweetener. Dykstra,
supra note 44, at 8.
52. Dissenters' statutory rights of appraisal generally do not apply to reverse stock splits.
Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1189.
53. There have been few reported cases involving the propriety of reverse stock splits. See,
e.g., Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 III. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal
dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d
385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
54. A strong case can be made that preferred shareholders should be entitled to vote
separately as a class on the proposal since most state statutes require a separate class vote
where there is going to be an increase or decrease in the number of authorized shares of the
class. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 242(c)(2) (1975); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.03(B)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1978).
55. While filing proxy materials with the SEC has been perfunctory, some members of the
SEC have begun to enforce proposed SEC Rule 13e-3A, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 11231, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 180,104, which would require
detailed disclosure even in reverse stock splits.
56. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-346 (1977).
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other fractional interests to aggregate full shares. If the minority shareholder
fails to acquire a full share, however, he is forced to accept cash for his
interest in the enterprise, and is thereby eliminated.5 7
Squeeze-out Mergers. A squeeze-out merger is another involuntary method
of eliminating the minority.5 8 This involves the merger of two corporations,
one having a controlling interest in the other. For example, corporation S, a
subsidiary of corporation P, is merged into corporation P. Corporation P is
usually either the parent of S or has been created by the controlling share-
holders of S for the sole purpose of squeezing the minority shareholders out
of S. In either case, when the merger is consummated the minority share-
holders of S are eliminated by P's exchanging the minority shareholders'
stock in S for either cash, debentures, or both.
Two statutory forms of merger can be utilized in eliminating the minority,
the long form merger and the short form merger. For the long form merger,
approval is required from the board of directors of each corporation and the
holders of a majority of a specified portion of each company's shares.59 As
an alternative to the long form merger, most states now have short form
merger statutes 6° which permit a parent corporation to merge a ninety6' or
ninety-five 62 percent subsidiary into itself, solely on the approval of the
parent's board of directors, and without a shareholder vote at either the
parent or subsidiary level. 63 Many state short form merger procedures pro-
vide for no prior notice to the minority shareholders.' Thus, the shareholder
57. There have been two reported cases involving reverse stock splits. See Teschner v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 111. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002
(1975); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup.
Ct. 1976).
58. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, §§ 5.13-.15. For a discussion of the short form merger
statute, see Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 596 (1965).
59. At common law, an equity interest could not be altered, and thus no merger effected
without the unanimous consent of all shareholders. See Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921) (an exception to the general rule was when the corporation was so
unprofitable that there was no reasonable prospect of conducting a business without a loss);
Kremer v. Public Drug Co., 41 S.D. 365, 170 N.W. 571 (1919) (majority shareholders attempted
to sell assets of corporation to new corporation wholly owned by majority shareholders). See
also E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 331 (1972); Gibson, How Fixed Are
Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 283 (1958).
60. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 75 (2d ed. 1971).
61. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975). The constitutionality of short form merger
statutes has been sustained against challenges claiming violation of due process and impairment
of contract. Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct.
1959), noted in 74 HARV. L. REV. 412 (1960).
62. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905 (McKinney 1963).
63. The short form merger originated in New York to remedy a situation which had
contributed to the collapse of some utility companies during the depression. To facilitate a
simplification of holding and operating company relationships, the New York Legislature
enacted the short form merger to circumvent blocking or delaying tactics employed by small but
belligerent minority interests. Similar procedures were made available to all corporations and as
the effectiveness of the short form merger became apparent, numerous state legislatures
adopted short form merger statutes. Comment, supra note 58, at 602. The legislative rationale
for the short form merger has been the promotion of operating efficiencies, the prevention of
delaying tactics of minority interests, and that both companies benefit from eliminating "the
difficulty and expense of insuring that continuing intercompany transactions and allocations of
overhead and other shared expense will always be handled on a 'fair' arm's length basis." Id. at
602-03.
64. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 75 (2d ed. 1971).
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is merely entitled to dissent and seek appraisal rights or accept the terms
offered in exchange for his equity.65
C. Effect of Going Private on Minority Interests
In contrast to the advantages going private confers upon corporations and
majority shareholders, such transactions can be detrimental to minority
interests. Hardships to the eliminated minority shareholder include the loss
of statutorily created appraisal rights,' the forced recognition of a taxable
gain or loss, 67 loss of the corporation's valuable business prospects,6 and a
loss of special relationships a minority shareholder might have with the
corporation, such as his status as an employee or creditor. Even when
dissenters' appraisal rights are available, a shareholder has little to gain by
invoking the appraisal statute if his shares are traded on a securities ex-
change or an over-the-counter market and he is offered consideration in
excess of the market price. Should the eliminated minority invoke his
appraisal rights, he encounters not only a delay in subsequent payment with
no dividend payments during the proceeding, but additionally faces strict
procedural requirements at trial and stands to incur substantial litigation
costs. The result is usually an award of the market price of his shares, with
no consideration for the actual going-concern value of his stock. Since the
timing of the going private transaction is within the control of the issuer or
majority shareholder, the transaction can be conveniently compared to a
private condemnation. The transaction additionally may occur during a
period of depressed market prices, causing the minority an unanticipated
loss. Depending on the type of transaction involved, prior notice and disclo-
sure may not be required. In individual cases the detrimental effects are
unlimited.
In some early cases the courts protected the minority shareholders' inter-
ests on the basis of a fiduciary duty owed the minority by the majority.69
65. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311, 314-16, aff'd, 41
Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11,87 N.E.2d 561
(1949); Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 55 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
66. The right to appraisal is generally only given for consolidations and mergers. See 2
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 81 (2d ed. 1971); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 262-65 (1962); Vorenberg, supra note 3,
at 1189.
67. In Delaware, for example, when a parent and subsidiary corporation merge, the board
is required by statute to pass a resolution stating "[Tl]he terms and conditions of the merger,
including the securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued, paid, delivered or granted by the
surviving corporation upon surrender of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corpora-
tions not owned by the parent corporation." DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975). This effective
Icashing in" could create an unexpected gain or loss from the transaction which might
adversely affect the shareholder's taxable income.
68. It is difficult to compensate the eliminated shareholder for the corporation's improved
business prospects. This difficulty arises because at the time of appraisal the evidence of
improvement in business prospects is often more intuitive than tangible. Further, appraisers
generally rely on conservative valuation formulas. Such valuations fail to reflect the special
appeal the company or industry might have in the market, a factor ordinarily considered when
the stock is sold through an underwriter. The majority may further complicate the procedure by
choosing a time for appraisal when the stock value is most difficult to assess. Vorenberg, supra
note 3, at 1202-03. See also Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1453 (1966).
69. See Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904). The court
considered whether the statute in question conferred an absolute right on a two-thirds majority
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Many recent state7" and federal7 decisions have attempted to apply this
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in transactions in which majority
control was material. 72 These courts have applied the "legitimate business
purpose" standard in determining whether the majority shareholders or the
directors of the corporation have fulfilled their fiduciary obligations in going
private transactions. Both federal and state courts have required the show-
ing of a legitimate business purpose for a corporation to go private. The
federal courts attempted to apply the business purpose requirement through
section 10(b) 73 and rule l0b-5;74 the state courts began applying the business
purpose requirement under common law fiduciary duty standards.
II. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSE: FEDERAL AND STATE LITIGATION
INVOLVING GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
A. Federal Law
The Securities Exchange Commission has consistently been concerned
with the going private phenomenon because of its effect upon the public
market.7 5 Consequently, the Commission proposed alternative rules 13e-
3A76 and 13e-3B 77 in 1974. The first rule would impose requirements of
disclosure and fairness on companies or their affiliates that engage in trans-
actions which might result in or be a part of a plan to go private. The second
rule would not only require the terms of the transaction to be fair, but also
require that a valid business purpose exist for engaging in the transaction.7"
of a prosperous corporation to dissolve and pay the minority for their interest in cash, when the
clear intent was to reorganize and pursue the business with the minority eliminated. The court,
in finding no cause for dissolution except elimination of the minority, enjoined the transaction.
The court focused on the inequity of allowing the majority to have that kind of power over the
minority. See also Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 675 (1941), which relied more specifically on fiduciary duty. That case also involved the
dissolution of a prosperous corporation. The court held that the freeze-out was unfair despite
adherence to legal form. The court was dissatisfied with appraisal as the exclusive economic
protection and presented a wide-ranging discussion of equitable principles.
70. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977); Schulwolf v. Cerro
Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
71. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
noted in 21 Sw. L.J. 739 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated
and remanded for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969) (exchange offer).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
75. See Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 2. The SEC views going private more in
terms of loss of SEC jurisdiction rather than in terms of elimination of minority shareholders. 4
A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 4.7, at 400.15. This can be seen from the proposed SEC
definitions of going private:
[Alny transaction or series of transactions engaged in by an issuer or its affiliate,
which would, if successful, permit the issuer to cease filing reports under the
Exchange Act ....
or
[A]ny transaction by an issuer or its affiliate which might directly or indirectly
result in the issuer being able to cease filing reports under the Exchange Act or
which might result in a significant impairment in the liquidity of the trading market
in its equity securities.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947 (1975).
76. Proposed Rule 13e-3[A], SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, 40 Fed.
Reg. 7947, 7950 (1975).
77. Proposed Rule 13e-3[B], SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, 40 Fed.
Reg. 7947, 7952 (1975).
78. Proposed Rule 13e-3[B](a)(l), SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, 40
Fed. Reg. 7947, 7952 (1975). Commissioner Sommer said specifically that he would not include
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With the proposed rules as background, the Second Circuit read a similar
business purpose requirement into rule lOb-5 in two 1976 decisions. 79 Marsh-
el v. AFW Fabric Corp. involved a corporation which had gone public in
1968 with public offerings of fifteen dollars a share, increased to twenty
dollars a share in 1969.80 After the stock price dropped to one dollar a share
in 1974, the owners of sixty-eight percent of the voting shares decided to
return the corporation to private status. This was to have been accomplished
by a long form merger of the public corporation with a shell corporation
created solely for the purpose of taking the public corporation private. The
merger would have eliminated the minority shareholders, thereby reducing
the number of shareholders to the point where the corporation could go
private. In response to an action brought by the minority shareholders to
enjoin the merger, the Second Circuit held that the majority shareholders
had breached a fiduciary duty owed to both the corporation and the minority
shareholders.81 The breach consisted of devising a scheme to defraud the
minority shareholders, as the proposed merger was without a valid corpo-
rate purpose. This use of a fraudulent scheme allowed the court to enjoin the
merger under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, which prohibits any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security. 2
Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit decided Green v. Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc.,83 which again concerned the application of rule 10b-5 to going
private transactions. Pursuant to the state short form merger procedure,
Kirby, a ninety-five percent subsidiary of Santa Fe, was to be merged with a
holding company created solely to return Kirby to private status. In re-
sponse to the challenge that no valid ground for applying rule lOb-5 had been
raised" the Second Circuit held that a claim is properly stated under rule
among business considerations the goal of "avoiding the cost and bother of SEC compliance
and Shareholder servicing." A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 2, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,010, at 84,699. One state court has recently made reference to
proposed rule 13e-3[B] in finding that a freeze-out merger had no valid business purpose. A
preliminary injunction was granted, with questions raised as to the fairness of the transaction.
Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566, 571 (Ch. 1975).
79. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded for a
determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976).
80. For an in-depth discussion of the case, see Banoff, Fraud Without Deceit: Marshel v.
AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1977).
81. The price determined by the controlling shareholders was to be paid out of the corpo-
rate treasury at a cost of $1,600,000. The controlling shareholders interest increased from 68%
to 100% without any additional investment on their part. The assets, however, decreased by the
$1,600,000 paid for the shares. 533 F.2d at 1280 n.4.
82. Section 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1977).
83. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), noted in 31 Sw. L.J. 739 (1977).
84. The court stated:
When controlling shareholders of a publicly held corporation use corporate funds
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l0b-5 "when it charges, in connection with a Delaware short form merger
statute, that the majority has breached its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with
minority shareholders by effecting the merger without any justifiable busi-
ness purpose." 85 In both Marshel and Sante Fe the majority shareholders
had fully disclosed their intentions to squeeze out the minority shareholders.
The Second Circuit recognized a difference between the classical applica-
tion of rule lOb-5 to cases involving misrepresentation and non-disclosure
and the application of rule lOb-5 to cases such as Sante Fe involving breach
of fiduciary duty.8 6 The court, therefore, restricted the Popkin v. Bishop
87
requirement of misrepresentation, non-disclosure allegation to the classical
lOb-5 cases. In cases involving breach of fiduciary duty, however, the court
adopted a "justifiable business purpose" requirement.
In an effort to resolve the reach and coverage of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 which had thus developed, the Supreme Court reviewed the Second
Circuit's opinion in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. The Court, however,
refused to adopt the Second Circuit's justifiable business purpose doc-
trine.88 It, instead, held that in an action in which a majority shareholder's
alleged breach of fiduciary duty by effecting a short form merger is chal-
lenged under section 10(b) or rule lOb-5, the claim must contain an allegation
of material misrepresentation or a material failure to disclose; lack of a
justifiable business purpose would not suffice to invoke section 10(b) or rule
lOb-5. 89 This interpretation limited the application of section 10(b) to situa-
tions involving manipulation or deception. While the Court expressed no
view as to the SEC's authority to promulgate rules covering going private
transactions under other sections of the Act, it eliminated section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 as a weapon for the eliminated shareholder, at least where no
material misrepresentation or omission had occurred.
Although there has been much discussion of the business purpose require-
ment by both the SEC and the federal courts, there does not appear to be a
place for the requirement under federal securities law in the near future
unless the transaction otherwise involves misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure of the purpose regarding a going private transaction.' The Supreme
to force extinction of the minority shareholders' interest for the sole purpose of
feeding the pocketbooks of the controlling shareholders, such conduct goes
beyond mere negligent mismanagement and is properly cognizable as an act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud ....
533 F.2d at 1290.
85. Id. at 1291.
86. Id. at 1289-90.
87. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
88. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 462 (1977), noted in 4 A. BROMBERG, supra
note 3, § 4.7, at 400.20-23.
89. The court stated it was "reluctant to recognize a cause of action ... to serve what is
'at best a subsidiary purpose' of the federal legislation." 430 U.S. at 478.
90. The SEC appears to have taken the Green decision in stride by proposing a new rule
and accompanying schedule concerning going private transactions without a business purpose
requirement. The new proposals, SEC Rule 13e-3, Proposed Rule 13e-3, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 33-5884, 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60100 (1977), and Proposed Schedule
13E-3, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33-5884, 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60102 (1977),
are an apparent alternative to Proposed Rules 13e-3A and -3B. The new proposals would
provide definitions, specific disclosure requirements, and anti-fraud provisions to regulate
going private transactions that are "unfair" to unaffiliated security holders, without Proposed
Rule 13e-3B's business purpose requirement.
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Court, however, did indicate that Congress had quite possibly viewed such
action as "one traditionally relegated to state law," 91 thus suggesting state
forums as the proper place for eliminated minority shareholders to raise
such claims.
B. State Law
While some state courts have refused to scrutinize going private transac-
tions beyond testing whether the minority had been treated fairly, other
courts have begun to examine these transactions in terms of whether there
was a legitimate business purpose for the transaction. The business purpose
requirement has been adopted in at least five jurisdictions as a standard for
testing whether there has been a breach of the majority shareholders'
fiduciary obligation to minority shareholders.92 A majority shareholder's
common law fiduciary duty prevents him from exercising corporate powers
if the effect is simply to enrich himself at the expense of the minority,
regardless of how absolute those powers appear to be.93 Both New York and
Delaware stand out because of the frequency of their application of the
business purpose test to determine whether this fiduciary duty has been met.
In New York the business purpose requirement was adopted in a proceeding
brought under New York's blue sky law in which a breach of the fiduciary
relationship between controlling and minority shareholders was at issue. 4
The business purpose standard has since been applied by New York courts
three times.95 In each case the business pupose requirement was applied to
test whether there had been a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the
majority shareholders to the minority.' In application, the business purpose
91. 430 U.S. at 478.
92. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974) (applying Georgia corporate law); Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., No. CA-000268 (Cal. Super.
Ct., L.A. Co., Nov. 19, 1975), cited in Comment, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business
Purpose Test For Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184, 1203 (1976); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977);
Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct.
1976). In addition, the Seventh Circuit certified a case to the Indiana Supreme Court to decide
whether a shareholder can attack a merger on the ground that it was motivated without a valid
business purpose. Gabhart v. Gabhart, 545 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1977).
93. In 1939 Justice Douglas set forth the standard of conduct by a fiduciary:
[The majority shareholder] cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly
...what he could not do directly. He cannot use his power for his personal
advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how
absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the equitable
limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or
advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939). See also H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 319-21, 457-82 (2d
ed. 1970).
94. People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, aff'd, 50 App.
Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975). This involved the same merger as that in Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
95. Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660
(Sup. Ct. 1976); Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, 87
Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380
N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
96. In Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87
Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 482 (Sup. Ct. 1976), the court explained the rationale for
applying a business purpose standard:
What, then, is the business purpose of the merger, and why must it be demon-
strated? The why is readily answerable. Meticulous compliance with statutory
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standard was considered separately from the issues of fraud, self dealing,
and fairness of the price. 97
The Delaware courts have also applied the business purpose requirement
as a part of the fiduciary duty those in control owe to the minority in the
exercise of corporate powers. 9 In Singer v. Magnavox Co. the Delaware
Supreme Court used the business purpose requirement as the first step in
examining a possible breach of a fiduciary duty to the minority. 99 After the
court had satisfied itself that a proper business purpose was in fact present,
the transaction was then scrutinized under the Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp. °0 rule of "entire fairness." Two Delaware cases since Singer have
applied the business purpose standard in the same manner. 0 1
III. LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSES: A DEFINITION
While state courts have begun to adopt the business purpose requirement,
specificity has been lacking regarding a definition of the standard. The
confusion concerning what constitutes a legitimate business purpose is aptly
pointed out by Justice Duffy in his majority opinion in Singer v. Magnavox
Co.:
Any inquiry into the business purpose of a merger immediately leads to
such questions as: 'Whose purpose?' or 'Whose business?' Is it that of
requirements can still be the device for unfair dealing, human ingenuity being
what it is. If the takeover represents nothing more than a naked grab for power,
with no further justification, that, in and of itself, may be one of the telltale signs
of overreaching. That overreaching may be fraud, in its original common law
sense of deception and concealment, or it may be some other species of chican-
ery. The presence of a legitimate corporate business purpose, over and above the
self-interest of the investors, tends to negate the 'raiding' or the 'milking' which
might justify the courts' equitable intervention.
97. The Tanzer court stated:
This court is called upon to pass on the compliance of a merger plan with state
law, even though not the state law of this jurisdiction. It does not, and has no
occasion to pass upon what a federal court might do if Rule lOb-5 were to be
invoked. Accordingly, taking into account the most recent cases, we must
conclude that there is no basis for equitable intervention in a proposed short form
merger which complies with every requirement of state law unless (1) fraud or
illegality clearly be shown, or (2) there has been concealment or non-disclosure of
material facts, or (3) that the merger is merely a device to deal inequitably with the
minority and has no valid business purpose, or (4) that there has been a breach of
fiduciary responsibility.
383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
98. The Delaware Supreme Court adopted the business purpose requirement in Singer v.
Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
99. The court stated:
This is not to say, however, that merely because the Court finds that a cash-
out merger was not made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stock-
holders, all relief must be denied to the minority stockholders in a § 251 merger.
On the contrary, the fiduciary obligation of the majority to the minority stockhol-ders remains and proof of a purpose, other than such freeze-out, without more,
will not necessarily discharge it. In such case the Court will scrutinize the
circumstances for compliance with the Sterling rule of 'entire fairness' and, if it
finds a violation thereof, will grant such relief as equity may require.
Id. at 980.
100. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). In Sterling the Delaware Supreme Court recog-
nized as established law that the dominant corporation, as a majority shareholder standing on
both sides of a merger transaction, has "the burden of establishing its entire fairness" to the
minority shareholders, sufficiently to "pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts." 93 A.2d
at 109-10.
101. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Young v. Valhi,
Inc., CA No. 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978).
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the corporation whose shares are (or were) held by the minority? If so it
may well be that the business purpose of that company. . . is advanced
by the merger. . . .On the other hand, if the corporation in which the
complainants held shares 'vanishes' in the merger, inquiry as to purpose
may be unrealistic if not academic. And if the business purpose of the
parent (or dominant) corporation should be examined . . .minority
shareholders of the subsidiary (or controlled corporation) may have
undue difficulty in raising and maintaining the issue.
0 2
Many arguments have been presented as to what business purposes are
legitimate business purposes.103 Authorities have argued for the categoriza-
tion of numerous business purposes as legitimate; this portion of the
Comment discusses the major business purposes that have been presented.
Danger of Financial Collapse. In Matteson v. Ziebarth'0° the Washington
Supreme Court became one of the first courts to apply the business purpose
standard to a going private transaction. The court adopted the proposition
that a freeze-out of minority shareholders motivated by a valid business
reason is a legitimate equitable corporate transaction that does not involve a
breach of the controlling shareholders' fiduciary duties. 0 5 A legitimate
business purpose was found to exist when insiders resorted to a freeze-out
of a minority shareholder when the corporation was on the brink of insol-
vency. The proposed merger and subsequent sale were virtually "the only
salvation for the hardpressed Ziebarth Corporation"' 10 because it was near
financial collapse.
The danger of financial collapse argument was also upheld in Polin v.
Conductron,"°" in which a merger between an electronics firm and a major
aircraft manufacturer was permitted. The electronics firm, in dire financial
condition, would have gone into bankruptcy had it failed to merge with the
aircraft manufacturer. Danger of financial collapse is a particularly persua-
sive business purpose and should be accepted in cases where the court is
convinced that one of the corporations is, in fact, in perilous financial
condition. Careful scrutiny, however, should be applied to ensure that the
financial records are not contrived to create the appearance of poor financial
health; such a deception could easily be created in a parent-subsidiary
relationship.
Shareholders as Employees. In two separate going private transactions the
defendant corporation contended that the business purpose for the transac-
102. 380 A.2d at 976.
103. See generally Greene, supra note 3; Solomon, supra note 3; Comment, Protection of
Minority Shareholders From Freeze-outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976);
Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 796
(1976); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975). See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Tanzer
Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383
N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 267, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957
(Sup. Ct. 1976).
104. 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) (en banc).
105. See Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1195-97. Professor Vorenberg also suggested that the
elimination of Matteson as a "trouble-maker" might have been a valid business purpose for the
squeeze-out. Id. at 1196.
106. 242 P.2d at 1034.
107. 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 178, 54 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1977).
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tion was the elimination of shareholders who were no longer employees. In
both transactions company policy required all shareholders to be employees
with a substantial interest in stock ownership and management responsibil-
ity.' 0 8 Thus, when status as an employee was terminated, the equity owner
was required to sell his interest to the corporation. In both cases, however,
the court disbelieved the defendants' contention. In Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co.,"° the case that reinstituted the use of the business purpose
requirement as a device for examining going private transactions, the major-
ity shareholders sought to freeze out a single minority shareholder who had
resigned from management in a close corporation. When the minority share-
holder refused to sell"10 his interest to the controlling shareholders the
majority arranged a short form merger of the old corporation into a newly
formed corporation. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Georgia
law prohibited the elimination of the minority through a merger when there
was no corporate purpose for the merger. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that a valid business purpose had been demonstrated in the main-
tenance of "a long-standing company policy of . . .having only active
shareholders as shareholders.""'
This same argument was subsequently raised in New York in application
to a reverse stock split.1"2 In Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition
Corp."13 the controlling shareholders adopted a reverse stock split consol-
idating the one million authorized shares into 250 shares. The plan disal-
lowed fractional shares, requiring their purchase by the corporation.
Conceding that the sole reason for the reverse stock split was the elimination
of the plaintiffs as shareholders, the defendants attempted to justify the plan
by stating that all remaining shareholders would be employees having a
substantial interest with respect to both stock ownership and management
responsibility. As in Bryan, the court reiused to accept the validity of the
business purpose. A long-standing corporate policy that all outstanding
stock be held by the corporate employees should be accepted by the courts
only when the corporation can show a legitimate business purpose for the
policy.
Elimination of Conflicts of Interest. The parent-subsidiary relationship
necessarily creates conflicts of interest concerning the allocation of business
opportunities and expenses. There is always the possibility that the minority
interest in the subsidiary will be treated unfairly. This danger arises from the
difficulty and expense of ensuring that intercompany transactions and allo-
cations of overhead and other shared expenses, as well as business and
investment opportunities, will always be handled on an arm's length basis.
108. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup.
Ct. 1976).
109. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
110. Bryan had consistently refused to sell because he considered the price offered too low.
111. 490 F.2d at 565.





The parent-subsidiary merger in Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc. 14 was premised on this conflict of interest problem." 5 The parent
corporation's principal stockholder, in defense of the proposed merger,
argued that the merger would eliminate possible conflicts of interest.11 6 The
court accepted the parent's desire to eliminate potential claims of conflicts
of interest as a proper business purpose for the proposed merger." 7
In Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp."8 a New York supreme court was also
presented with elimination of conflicts of interest as the business purpose
behind a parent corporation's merger with its forty-five percent subsidiary.
The minority shareholders of the subsidiary were to receive preferred stock
in the merged corporation in exchange for their common stock. Injunctive
relief was requested because the aggrieved minority shareholders were
going to receive a lesser benefit from the merger than the controlling share-
holders. 119 One valid corporate purpose presented by the defendant corpora-
tion for the merger was the desire to "combine [to allow] . . . inter-company
transactions . . . presently restricted because of possible conflicts of inter-
est . . "120 The court refused to enjoin the proposed merger, accepting
this as a valid corporate purpose for the transaction.'
2
'
The elimination of possible conflicts of interest as a valid business pur-
pose was subsequently affirmed by another New York supreme court in
Tanzer Economic Associates Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Special-
ties, Inc. 122 In Tanzer the court refused to enjoin a proposed merger be-
tween a parent corporation food processor, canner, and distributor and its
114. 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975) (application of
Delaware law), noted in Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests By Cash Merger: Two
Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAW. 699, 702-04 (1975).
115. It is questionable whether a business purpose need be presented by both the parent and
subsidiary in a parent-subsidiary merger. The Delaware Supreme Court noted, but failed to
resolve, the issue in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 n.11 (Del. 1977). In Grimes,
however, the court scrutinized both the parent and subsidiary concerning their conflicts of
interest contention. This writer contends that no legitimate business purpose need be shown by
either the surviving corporation or the corporation which merged with the entity which elimi-
nated the minority since the question is only whether the original corporation in which the
minority owned an interest breached its fiduciary obligations.
116. The parent corporation contested that there were two kinds of possible conflict of
interest problems. First, any allocation of business opportunity between the parent and the
subsidiary could be questioned depending on whether it was profitable or not. Secondly, the
allocation of managerial personnel and the price to be charged for their services would present
conflict of interest problems. 392 F. Supp. at 1399.
117. The court concluded that both the parent and the subsidiary had valid business reasons
for the merger: (1) both engaged in similar businesses; (2) joint ventures and business dealings
between the corporations would be inhibited by potential claims of conflict of interest by either
the parent or subsidiary shareholders; (3) the merger promised extensive savings in the day-to-
day operations of two corporations. Id. at 1402.
118. 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976). This was the first New York state
court to apply the business purpose standard after adoption in People v. Concord Fabrics, 83
Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975) (a
merger was enjoined in a proceeding brought by the attorney general under the state blue sky
law).
119. Prior to Concord Fabrics and Schuiwolf appraisal and payment was the exclusive
remedy of dissenting shareholders in a merger under New York law. Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 338 N.E.2d 614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1975).
120. 380 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
121. The other corporate purposes presented and accepted were: (1) to consolidate for
financial reporting and tax purposes; and (2) to combine management and resources of two
businesses engaged in related businesses. Id. at 962.
122. 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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ninety-two percent subsidiary, a food manufacturer.'23 Pursuant to the mer-
ger, the minority was to be cashed out at a price sixty-five percent above
market price. Of the numerous business purposes 24 presented by the de-
fendant, two of the most significant were the prevention of potential claims
of conflicts of interest and the elimination of the possibility of charges of
overreaching or unfairness inherent in a public corporation. 25 The court
found these purposes acceptable. An additional component of the conflicts
of interest problem has been the elimination of the possibility of derivative
suits. While the hidden costs of preventing conflicts of interest are substan-
tial, the major impetus to act cautiously in intercompany transactions is the
possibility of minority shareholder derivative suits.
Although the conflicts of interest problem should be recognized as a valid
business purpose, the courts should examine the transactions closely to
determine whether conflicts of interest do in fact exist. In Young v. Valhi,
Inc., '26 for example, a Delaware court of chancery considered whether there
had actually been conflicts of interest. The court determined that past
conflicts of interest had been minimal and rejected as contrived a blanket
contention that the merger would prevent future conflicts of interest. Along
these lines, for a court to accept the elimination of conflicts of interest as a
valid business purpose it should also be persuaded that elimination of the
minority was necessary to obtain the business purpose. It should be very
difficult to eliminate the minority in a subsidiary when the parent is publicly
held and the minority is not given a chance to remain as shareholders in the
parent. 27 In determining whether the conflicts of interest argument should
be accepted, the courts necessarily must examine the business of both the
parent and the subsidiary. While the parent is more apt to overreach in
dealing with the subsidiary, the subsidiary must also have a business pur-
pose for eliminating the minority. 28
Operating Efficiencies.129 Eliminating the costs of maintaining two sepa-
rate companies has been accepted as a legitimate business purpose. This
123. The merger was between Libby, McNeil & Libby and Universal Food Specialties, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Nestle Alimentana, S.A., 383 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
124. The business purposes presented were: (1) improved management and corporate plan-
ning since greater resources would be available; (2) existing management in two corporations
would be mutually available; (3) savings would result from economies in centralized procure-
ment of raw materials; (4) marketing economy in joint distribution, warehousing, and advertis-
ing; (5) duplication of departments and personnel could be avoided; (6) a greater diversity of
products would result in the evening out of cyclical demand; (7) stronger financial position with
fewer problems in outside financing and more efficient cash flow; (8) potential claims of
conflicts of interest would be prevented; (9) without public shareholders controlling corporation
would not be subject to charges of overreaching or unfairness to the minority; (10) all time,
expense, and energy incurred in connection with stock transfers, dividends, proxy notices,
annual reports, SEC compliance, and attendant legal problems would be eliminated. Id. at 483.
125. Id.
126. CA No. 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978).
127. Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976), involved
a merger where the minority shareholders in the subsidiary were allowed to remain as share-
holders. The court noted that the transaction was not a freeze-out, but still applied the business
purpose requirement to the merger.
128. In Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.), aff'd,
521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975), both the parent and subsidiary had valid business reasons for the
merger. See note 117 supra.
129. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 1037; Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1199-1200.
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purpose was accepted in Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,130 in
which the court found that there promised to be joint savings in excess of
$300,000 per year by going private.131 This equalled approximately thirty-
four cents for each publicly held share, a substantial savings. Another of the
business purposes accepted in Tanzer Economic Associates Profit Sharing
Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc.132 was the desire to effect savings
which would result from eliminating duplicated functions, economies in
centralized procurement of raw materials, marketing economy in joint distri-
bution, warehousing, and advertising, and better tax planning. A third case
involving the business purpose of operating efficiency was Techner v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co. 33 The Illinois Supreme Court refused to enjoin a
reverse stock split 134 that would have eliminated the minority shareholders.
The proposed transaction was the final step in an acquisition and was found
to be legitimate, as it resulted in a reduction of corporate expenses and a
simplification of corporate procedures. 35
Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp. 136 and Cole v. Schlenley Industries, Inc. 137 also
involved a business purpose of operating efficiencies. Schulwolf involved a
consolidation for financial reporting and tax reporting and a combination of
management and resources in related businesses, 13  while Schlenley in-
volved a simplification of the corporate structure. Both mergers were per-
mitted, and the business purposes were accepted as justification for going
private.
While creating operating efficiencies appears to be a valid business pur-
pose justifying going private, actual savings must be determined. Further, it
must be certain that the savings could not be achieved by an alternate
method less destructive of minority interests. In Young v. Valhi, for exam-
ple, a Delaware court of chancery refused to accept tax savings as a
130. 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.), affl'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975).
131. The savings were to occur due to a reduction in salaries and legal and accounting
expenses, as well as savings in franchise taxes, stock transfer fees, public relations expenses,
directors' fees and the use of tax losses. 392 F. Supp. at 1400.
132. 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
133. 59 II1. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
134. In Teschner, Lincoln National Corporation, the majority shareholder of Chicago Title,
made an exchange offer to the shareholders of Chicago Title, offering one share of Lincoln
preferred for each share of Chicago Title common stock. Through this and a subsequent cash
tender offer Lincoln gained control of 99.9% of Chicago Title. In order to simplify its corporate
activities and reduce expenses Lincoln amended Chicago Title's articles of incorporation to
authorize a reverse stock split which prohibited the issuance of fractional shares and required
the purchase by Chicago Title of all outstanding fractional share interests. A shareholder
eliminated in the reverse stock split brought the action seeking restoration of her status as a
shareholder and declaration that the meeting held to amend Chicago's articles of incorporation
was illegal and invalid as a breach of fiduciary duty and a deprivation of property without due
process of law. 322 N.E.2d at 55-56.
135. The court, however, did not specifically adopt a business purpose requirement, but said
that the plaintiff had not alleged or shown any improper purpose on the part of the defendants.
Id. at 58.
136. 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
137. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 95,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
remanded, 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977).
138. Schenley involved a merger between Schenley and its 88% parent corporation, Glen
Alden. Schenley's minority shareholders were to receive cash and Glen Alden debentures. The
merger was scrutinized under the Securities Exchange Act, not state corporate law.
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legitimate business purpose since the savings could have been achieved by
other means less damaging to minority interests.' Courts, additionally,
should be certain that the estimated savings the remaining corporation
would experience in merging are realistic, not inflated, and should consider
whether the costs of eliminating the minority outweigh the foreseeable
monetary savings through greater operating efficiencies.
Prudent Management.4 ' One commentator has concluded that the most
significant motivation for a corporation to go private is "the fundamental
incompatibility in many enterprises between prudent management and the
constraints imposed by public ownership.' 14' As to the functioning of a
corporation, prudent management is generally concerned with long term
corporate growth and stability. The mere fact that a corporation is public, on
the other hand, creates enormous pressures to perform for the short run. As
the short term pressures often prove to be the most compelling, the result is
"payment of higher income taxes, hasty introduction of new products, ill-
conceived entry into new markets, impulsive acquisitions of other busi-
nesses, retention of unsatisfactory customers in lieu of recognizing bad
receivables, deterioration of research, products, and services, and a host of
other imprudent actions."', 42 Although difficult to quantify, a strong argu-
ment can be made for the position that the desire to eliminate this pressure
constitutes a valid business purpose. If management in a publicly held
corporation must increase profits for the short run, the necessary result is
hasty, ill-conceived decisions.
Public status has the additional disadvantage of inhibiting corporate in-
volvement in many activities which otherwise might increase corporate
profitability. This results because of the rigid disclosure requirements
placed on a public corporation and the uncertainty of the effect of the public
disclosure of such information. A public corporation, for example, might be
less inclined to expend sums to entertain clients because this would have to
be made public. The private corporation, on the other hand, could entertain
clients, thus increasing corporate profits without the corresponding burden
of making such information public. In all such circumstances involving the
claimed business purpose of prudent management the court must be per-
suaded that actual monetary savings would result because of a change in
management objectives.
Cost of Disclosure and Deregistration Savings. 4  One obvious advantage
139. CA No. 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978). The court was satisfied that the tax savings
could have been achieved by the 55% parent acquiring an 80% interest in the subsidiary, by the
merger of the parent corporation into the subsidiary, or through other corporate acquisitions.
140. See generally Borden, supra note 3, at 1006-08; Brudney, supra note 3, at 1034-35;
Comment, supra note 9, at 1208-09.
141. Borden, supra note 3, at 1006-07. The demands imposed upon a publicly held corpora-
tion can cause economically undesirable results when the management's desire to maximize
profits in the short run, in order to raise the current market price, replaces the prudent
considerations essential for the long run welfare of the corporation. Id. at 1008.
142. Id. at 1007.
143. Borden, supra note 3, at 1008-09; Brudney, supra note 3, at 1032-33; Comment, supra
note 140, at 1210-11; Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders From Freezeouts Through
Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421, 1439-40 (1976); Note, supra note 36, at 907-08.
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of going private is the corresponding corporate savings which can result.144
The public corporation has the duty to provide the shareholders with meet-
ings, annual reports, transfer agents, and communications. The cost of
servicing public shareholders in such a manner has been estimated to be
$75,000 to $200,000 per year depending on the size of the corporation. 145 A
corresponding expense in this regard is the diversion of management time
and attention from the business affairs of the enterprise to potentially
wasteful concerns such as shareholder relations, auditing, and legal matters.
An additional cost common to the public corporation is the expense of
preparing reports and various other filings with the SEC. Thus, deregulation
obviates the necessity of preparing reports and filings and eliminates the
costs of servicing the public shareholders.
Another contended "cost" peculiar to the public corporation is that the
disclosure requirements, which compel public corporations to divulge more
than they otherwise would, result in extensive liability for all concerned."4
This argument was raised in Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc.,4 v in which the
defendants contended that the going private transaction was instituted for
the legitimate business end of removing the possible liability to the public
shareholders for noncompliance with disclosure requirements. The court,
however, refused to accept this as a sufficient business purpose for the
proposed transaction.
Corporations raise the complaint concerning disclosure requirements that,
pursuant thereto, they are occasionally required to disclose business sec-
rets. In Kaufman v. Lawrence, 48 for example, the defendant corporation
stated that it had decided to go private because previous negotiations for the
acquisition of another company were subject to SEC disclosure require-
ments.' 49 This prospect proved more burdensome than the acquisition was
worth.
Although achieving a savings from deregulation and elimination of the
costs of disclosure have been persistently argued as valid business purposes,
no court has accepted these arguments without more substantial supplemen-
tal business purposes for the going private transaction. 50 Notably, the
elimination of the "time, expense and energy incurred in connection with
stock transfers, dividends, proxy notices, annual reports, SEC compliance
and the attendant legal problems" was accepted as a legitimate business
purpose in Tanzer Economic Associates Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal
144. Commissioner Sommer stated that he would not include among business considerations
the goal of "avoiding the cost and bother of SEC compliance and shareholder servicing." A.A.
Sommer, Jr., supra note 2, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010, at
84,699.
145. See Borden, supra note 3, at 1007; Note, supra note 36, at 907.
146. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also Note, The Liability of Outside Directors Under Rule lOb-5, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 551, 556-59 (1974).
147. No. CA-000268 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Co., Nov. 19, 1975).
148. 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
149. The validity of such a claim has been challenged. Solomon, supra note 3, at 146 n.17.
150. In Jutkowitz the defendants argued that the merger had a valid business purpose since it
would eliminate the costly burden of compliance with SEC regulations. Again, however, the
court refused to accept this as a sufficient business purpose for the merger.
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Food Specialties, Inc. 151 The extent to which Tanzer is authority for accept-
ance of this business purpose as the sole factor, however, is uncertain as it
was but one of ten business purposes presented.'52 The court did not dis-
close whether it would accept this as a valid business purpose if presented
without the other substantiating business purposes for the going private
transaction.
Courts should accept the avoidance of costs associated with compliance
with SEC regulations as a valid business purpose. The major reason corpo-
rations go public is to gain access to the stock market. Public status affords
the corporation a means of obtaining financing at a more favorable price.
Before a corporation goes public it balances the risks of liability and the
costs of servicing shareholders against the value of being able to raise capital
at a favorable price through the stock market. When access to the public
market is eliminated because of stock market conditions, retaining public
status can no longer be justified financially. Rather than continue to incur
the costs and liabilities inherent in public status, public corporations should
be allowed to go private. An additional factor to consider, however, is the
anticipated savings in eliminating the cost of servicing shareholders weighed
against the expense of going private. The corporation must bear both the
cost of repurchasing the shares and considerable legal, accounting, and
brokerage expenses. The savings might mean a very poor yield on such a
large investment. In particular situations, however, there could be real
savings, especially in the case of a small public corporation.
Drop in Market Price.'53 Another rationale used in some going private
transactions has been that the stock is merely a bargain, 54 a rationale similar
to that applied to "legitimate issuer repurchase programs." A limited share
repurchasing plan can be justified on grounds that it is the functional
equivalent of a dividend, it creates a leverage effect, it has a positive effect
on earnings per share, and it is motivated by the conviction of management
that the stock represents a good investment. Such justifications, however,
fail to recognize the distinction between a limited share repurchase, in which
the shareholders voluntarily surrender their shares, and a total share re-
purchase which involuntarily eliminates the minority. To the totally elimi-
nated minority the repurchase is not an alternative to dividends. While the
reduction in shares will increase earnings per share, thereby resulting in a
higher market price, the eliminated shareholders will not share in this, as
their equity interest in the corporation is involuntarily extinguished. Since
the repurchase necessarily benefits only the controlling shareholders, dis-
cussion of repurchase rationales should be accordingly qualified as they
would seem to constitute a flagrant breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the
minority, and thus should not be accepted as a valid business purpose.
151. 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
152. See note 124 supra.
153. Comment, supra note 103, at 1443; see Note, supra note 36, at 906-07.
154. See generally H. GUTHMAN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 622-25 (4th
ed. 1962); Moskowitz, Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 51 NEB. L. REV. 193, 193-95 (1971).
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Increasing Value of Stock. 155 Many corporations wish to go private be-
cause the advantages previously foreseen in public status have failed to
materialize. Many corporations thought the market of the late 1960's would
increase the value of their stock considerably. This would have enabled
them to acquire other firms and retain key employees through stock option
programs made more profitable by the higher value of the company's stock.
Instead, while earnings went up, their price/earnings ratio collapsed with the
stock market.1 6 By going private, however, this problem could be circum-
vented. The stock used for stock option and acquisition programs of a
private corporation, unlike a public corporation, could be tied to book value
rather than the public market of the business. As book value is often above
market price, the net effect is that of a buy back. 157 The nature of book
value, stable but increasing in value over the years, makes it more attractive
than market price, which is often highly volatile, to both the corporation and
the stock optionee.
While no case has arisen in which the defendant corporation contended
that the business purpose for the going private transaction was to increase
the value of the stock for a stock option plan, the court in Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co. 158 implied that this would be a valid business purpose.
The court stated that the going private transaction "was not connected with
a stock option plan or other proper purpose. 159 Increasing the value of its
stock is rarely argued by corporations as a valid business purpose for going
private since acquisitions of other corporations through exchange offers
usually take the company back into the public realm. Thus, a corporation
should not be allowed to go private to increase its stock value for acquisi-
tions through exchange offers, since one set of minority shareholders would
simply be substituted with a new set when the first acquisition was made. In
addition, privately held stock is not necessarily worth more; it is merely
subject to fewer variables.16°
Long Term Debt Financing. Recently another business purpose was ac-
155. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 1035; Comment, supra note 103, at 1443; Note, supra
note 36, at 908.
156. With the stock market drop, the anticipated uses of a publicly traded stock vanished.
"Prompting ... [corporations] to go private was the fact that the low prices of their securities
made stock options of scant value in attracting and keeping good employees, and were
definitely no aid in acquisitions or mergers." Pacey, More Firms Are Turning Their Back on
Wall Street, Barron's, Mar. 4, 1974, at 3; see Prospectus Pursuant to Exchange Offer of Wells,
Rich, Greene, Inc., Nov. 4, 1974, at 14, cited in Moore, supra note 3, at 324:
The Company's Board of Directors has come to the conclusion that a public
market for the Common Stock is no longer providing the benefits to the Company
which had originally been anticipated. In particular, because of the often uncer-
tain and disappointing prices of the Common Stock, stock options have failed to
provide employee incentives needed by the Company, and at recent prices the
Common Stock no longer serves as an effective means of acquiring other agen-
cies.
157. See, e.g., Prospectus of Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc., Nov. 4, 1974, at 14, cited in Note,
supra note 36, at 908 n.26 (corporation intends to restructure its stock option plan around the
stock's book value).
158. Book value rises, of course, only when the purchase price paid by the corporation is
lower than the stock's initial book value.
159. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967).
160. 230 A.2d at 777.
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cepted by the Delaware Supreme Court.161 In Tanzer v. International Gener-
al Industries, Inc. 162 an eighty-one percent subsidiary of International Gen-
eral was merged into a newly created, wholly owned International General
subsidiary. The business purpose presented and accepted was that the
merger would facilitate long term debt financing by International General.
This business purpose was also accepted in Tanzer Economic Associates
Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc.' 63 The availability of
long term debt financing should be accepted as a valid business purpose for
a going private transaction if the defendant can substantiate that the corpo-
ration is both in need of long term debt financing and that the financing
cannot be obtained economically while still public.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSE STANDARD
The threshold question is whether a business purpose is to be required for
both voluntary and involuntary transactions."6 In the voluntary context,
since tender offers are subject to individual shareholder approval, it would
appear unnecessary to require the corporation to present a legitimate busi-
ness purpose for the transaction. Factors exist, however, requiring the
application of the business purpose standard to voluntary transactions. In
such volitional transactions the dissenting shareholders have no statutorily
afforded appraisal rights. 165 If the minority shareholder is offered an unsatis-
factory price for his interest in the corporation, he is forced to choose
between accepting the unsatisfactory price or the futility of remaining a
shareholder in a corporation subject to stagnant liquidity and deprivation of
rights under federal securities law.166
161. The notion that privately held stock is worth more for acquisition and stock option
programs is, however, far from self-evident. In the 1960's there was no indication that private
corporations sold at higher multiples than publicly held corporations. Likewise, there is no
reason why non-marketable stock constitutes a more useful currency to stimulate employees
than do options to buy marketable stock. Brudney, supra note 3, at 1035 n.60.
162. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). The Delaware Supreme Court had only adopted the business
purpose standard a month earlier in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), where
the court adopted the business purpose requirement, but failed to delineate what would be
acceptable business purposes for the elimination of the minority shareholders.
163. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
164. In answering this question the rationales behind adoption of the business purpose
requirement in going private transactions should be considered. First, in Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), the Fifth Circuit
implicitly recognized that the right of appraisal could no longer be relied on as an exclusive
remedy. In an abrupt departure from precedents which relied on appraisal as an exclusive
remedy and those requiring a showing of substantive fairness, the court did not even consider
the possibility that appraisal could protect the minority's interest. Second, courts felt compelled
to protect minority shareholders when controlling shareholders and corporations used state
statutory procedures to eliminate minority interests inconsistent with the rationale for adopting
the procedure, the facilitation of "business transactions." See Beloff v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 20-21, 87 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1949). See also note 96 supra.
165. See note 30 supra.
166. A company whose number of record shareholders is reduced to less than 300, and
whose stock is not listed on a national exchange, may be deregistered under the Securities
Exchange Act 90 days after the company certifies the reduction in the number of shareholders
to the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(2)(H)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(H)(4)
(1976). Proxy requirements and insider reporting and trading restraints become inapplicable
after the 90-day period has elapsed. Periodic reports under § 13(a) of the 1934 Act would no
longer be required after the end of the fiscal year in which the company deregisters. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 15d, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976). See also note 31 supra.
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In the context of involuntary transactions, an equally appealing argument
can be asserted for requiring a legitimate business purpose for the transac-
tion. Reverse stock splits should be subject to the business purpose require-
ment since dissenters' appraisal rights are unavailable. The eliminated
minority shareholder, therefore, has no method for receiving the fair value
for his shares.167 When the minority interest is eliminated by a sale of the
corporate assets, the corporation should also have a legitimate business
purpose for the transaction. At common law the minority was protected, as
unanimous shareholder approval was required for a sale of the assets. This
requirement was gradually eroded, however, because of the injustice which
could result if there were even one shareholder with a small interest who
refused to go along with a sale."6 The relaxation of the unanimous share-
holder approval requirement has led to the need for another test to insure
that the minority can still be adequately protected. Thus, when the sale of
assets is used simply to eliminate the minority, the business purpose require-
ment should be used to enjoin the transaction.
Courts which apply the business purpose requirement merely because
dissenters' appraisal rights are inadequate should accept a less compelling
business purpose if the transaction is inherently "fair" to the minority
interests; the shareholders receive a fair price and fair treatment at the
hands of the acquiring corporation. Certainly cash-out mergers and similar
transactions of close corporations 69 should require a stricter business pur-
pose than publicly held corporations. 170 In a close corporation there is no
public market, creating the added difficulty of finding a fair price for the
interest of the eliminated.' 7' As a practical matter, the close corporation
investor is not generally a market-oriented investor, but rather is interested
in and should not be deprived of the opportunity of deriving the benefits of
his long term investment.
The business purpose requirement has typically arisen in suits for injunc-
tive relief prior to the consummation of the corporate transaction. For
167. See note 52 supra.
168. In re Timmis aptly points out the evils present and the rationale for the change in the
requirement that all shareholders approve a sale of assets:
(I) The injustice to the bulk of the stockholders from want of power in a
corporation to sell its business or an essential part thereof to another corporation
organized for the purpose, frequently from its own membership, on terms deemed
advantageous by the holders of a large majority of the stock. (2) The injustice to
minority stockholders of requiring them to abandon, change, or limit their busi-
ness if the majority should have the power to direct such a sale. An incidental evil
was the power of a dissenting stockholder to compel the majority to buy him out
on his own terms in order to secure unanimous consent with no one left to
question the transaction.
200 N.Y. 177, 181,93 N.E. 522, 523 (1910).
169. The term "close corporation" has various definitions. See I F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPO-
RATIONS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1971).
170. The different treatment accorded the minority shareholders in Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), and Grimes v. Donald-
son, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975),
contrast the courts' inclination to preserve a minority shareholder's interest in a closely held
corporation. The freeze-out of a minority shareholder of a close corporation was enjoined in
Bryan. In Grimes, however, the court distinguished Bryan on this very point, allowing a
merger between a privately held parent corporation and its publicly held subsidiary.




example, all four New York cases applied the business purpose requirement
only when the state attorney general or minority shareholders sought to
enjoin a corporate transaction which had not yet been effectuated. 72 It
could be contended, therefore, that the business purpose requirement
should arise only when a party is seeking injunctive relief. The rationale
would be that equity should tip the scales against the defendant corporation
and preserve the status quo pending a hearing on "fairness," a hearing that
would take time. To prevent the issuance of an injunction the defendant
corporation would merely be required to present a legitimate business pur-
pose. The plaintiffs would then be relegated to their remedy at law, dam-
ages, for any injury suffered. None of the New York cases, however,
expressly gave the business purpose requirement such a limited application.
The New York courts have merely stated that the business purpose require-
ment is part of the fiduciary duty standard, along with the issues of fraud,
self-dealing, and unfairness.17 3 Since thequestion whether there has been a
breach of a fiduciary duty has not been limited to suits for injunctive relief,
the courts should not so limit the business purpose standard.
The application of the business purpose requirement in Singer v. Mag-
navox Co. 174 gives added weight to a broad application of the business
purpose requirement. The Singer litigation concerned a merger which had
occurred two years earlier. The minority shareholders sought nullification of
the merger. The court of chancery, however, dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.'75 The Delaware Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the defendant corporation must show both a legiti-
mate business purpose for the merger and compliance with the "entire
fairness" rule.176 A limited application of the business purpose requirement
to only injunctive suits would be grossly unfair to litigants who were unable
to reach the courts prior to the consummation of the corporate transaction.
This is especially prevalent in the short form merger area. While notice prior
to the merger is required in some states, others require no notice or notice
after the transaction has taken effect.
Another complex question in this context is where the burden of proof
should lie in this type of proceeding. Traditionally the plaintiff was burdened
with the duty of negating the existence of a legitimate business purpose. The
trend, however, is to place the burden upon the defendant corporation or
control persons. In New York, transactions involving interested mergers
have been subject to "careful judicial scrutiny' ' 7 7 which shifts the burden to
the fiduciary to prove the fairness of the transaction.17 In Delaware, inter-
172. Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660
(Sup. Ct. 1976); Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, 87
Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 267, 380
N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d
550, aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975).
173. See note 97 supra.
174. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
175. 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976).
176. See note 99 supra.
177. See Kutik v. Taylor, 80 Misc. 2d 839, 364 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
178. See Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825, 834 (1944).
[Vol. 32
COMMENTS
ested mergers have been subject to "close scrutiny" to establish the "in-
trinsic fairness" of the merger, with an analogous shift of the burden of
proof. 179 These shifts have also been applied when the business purpose test
was involved. In only one of the going private cases recently decided was
the burden of proof placed upon the plaintiff.180 In Tanzer Economic As-
sociates Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc. a New York
supreme court stated that the plaintiff had the burden of negating the
existence of a legitimate business purpose for the merger.' 8' In each of the
remaining cases the burden of proof was shifted to the defendant corpora-
tion either explicitly' 82 or impliedly.1
83
V. CONCLUSION
The expanding permissiveness of state corporate codes has required state
judiciaries to examine going private transactions using fiduciary duty stan-
dards, both because of the inadequacy of dissenters' appraisal rights and the
inappropriate use of state statutory procedures. While the courts have begun
to apply the business purpose requirement, they have failed to define what
constitutes a valid business purpose. While case law will eventually define
the standard, the interim will be a period of confusion and misinterpretation.
In order to alleviate this problem, courts should not be hesitant to delineate
valid business purposes and the rationale behind their validity.
179. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (1952).
180. Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87
Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
181. The court stated: "Plaintiff... has, in this application for injunctive relief, the burden
of showing that there is no legitimate business purpose which could be served by this merger
. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
182. In AIbright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974), the court stated that the
plaintiff does not have the duty of negating a legitimate corporate purpose. In Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit stated:
However, where a short-form merger involving use of a dummy corporation
appears to be used for no purpose other than to squeeze out minority public
shareholders, as is alleged in this case, the burden is upon the corporate insiders
to demonstrate the existence of a legitimate compelling corporate purpose.
Id. at 1299.
183. Impliedly, the burden of proof has been placed on the defendant because the court has
ruled against the defendant corporation because it either failed to present a legitimate business
purpose or because it failed to present a compelling business purpose. In People v. Concord
Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377
N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975), the court stated in discussion of their reasoning that no real corporate
purpose had been demonstrated, implying that the defendant corporation had to demonstrate a
business purpose for the merger. In Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d
385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976), the court stated:
Where there is an allegation of fraud, illegality or bad faith, coupled with a
tenuous showing of legitimate corporate business purpose, fairness requires that a
minority shareholder be afforded an opportunity to fully contest the actions of the
majority before he is deprived of his property. Where a strong and compelling
corporate business purpose is shown, however, the courts should not interfere at
the mere whim of a dissident shareholder.
384 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65.
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